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Abstract 
Sense of agency (SoA) is a compelling but fragile experience that is augmented or attenuated 
by internal signals and by external cues. A disruption in SoA may characterise individual 
symptoms of mental illness such as delusions of control. Indeed, it has been argued that 
generic SoA disturbances may lie at the heart of delusions and hallucinations that characterise 
schizophrenia. A clearer understanding of how sensorimotor, perceptual and environmental 
cues complement, or compete with, each other in engendering SoA may prove valuable in 
deepening our understanding the agency disruptions that characterise certain focal 
neurological disorders and mental illnesses. Here we examine the integration of SoA cues in 
health and illness, describing a simple framework of this integration based on Bayesian 
principles. We extend this to consider how alterations in cue integration may lead to aberrant 
experiences of agency. 
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Introduction 
 
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of generating and controlling actions in order to 
influence events in the outside world. There have, traditionally, been two competing views of 
the cognitive origins of SoA. On the one hand it has been suggested that it arises principally 
from processes serving motor control (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Haggard, 2005). 
On the other, external, situational cues have been emphasised (Wegner, 2002; Wegner, 
2003).   
 
In essence, these views differ according to whether they posit that SoA emerges from internal 
or external cues. More recently this dichotomy has been challenged by the suggestion that 
both sources of information are likely to be critical and that SoA depends on both internal and 
external cueing (Wegner & Sparrow, 2004; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008; Moore, Wegner, and Haggard, 2009). In this paper we review 
evidence suggesting that multiple cues contribute to SoA and go on to introduce cue 
integration approaches that have proved successful in modelling human perception. In the 
context of this cue integration perspective, we consider psychiatric and neurological 
manifestations of disruptions in SoA.  
 
1. Evidence for the contribution of multiple cues to SoA  
 
Theories based on computational models of motor control suggest that SoA arises principally 
from internal cueing (from the very motoric signals responsible for generating the movement 
itself). Optimal motor control and learning require predictions of both the future states of the 
motor system and the sensory consequences of movement (Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). 
These predictions are derived from internal forward models, of which there are two classes: 
forward dynamic and forward sensory. The forward dynamic model captures the dynamics of 
bodily movement. The forward sensory model captures the causal relation between 
movements and their sensory consequences. The forward model is thought to play a key role 
in SoA (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith, Blakermore, & Wolpert, 2000). According to the so-
called ‘Comparator Model’ (CM) of SoA, predicted sensory information is compared with 
actual sensory information and, if there is a match, the sensory events are recognised as self-
generated and SoA ensues.  If there is mismatch, then the sensory information describes an 
external event, and SoA is attenuated or lost.  This model has been used to explain a range of 
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phenomena, such as the perceptual attenuation of self-generated stimuli (Weiskrantz, Elliott, 
& Darlington, 1971; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000) and the aberrant experience of 
agency characteristic of delusions of control (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith, 2005). 
  
In contrast, others have emphasised the role of external, situational cues, citing evidence that 
SoA can be modulated by priming participants with thoughts relevant to a movement just 
before it is made. For example, using this approach Wegner and Wheatley (1999) induced a 
false SoA for movements that participants had not in fact performed. Subsequent studies have 
replicated and extended this finding, showing that consistency between prime-induced prior 
thought and subsequent action can increase agency judgments for self-generated actions 
(Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006) and even enhances the experience of 
vicarious agency for another person’s actions (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004) and. 
As well as suggesting that SoA is fallible, these studies demonstrate that, even in the absence 
of internal motoric signals (when the participant plays no objective role in bringing about the 
outcome), SoA can occur (see Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008, for extensive discussion 
of this).  
 
Thus, SoA can be related both to internal motoric signals and to external cues. There is 
further compelling evidence from research based on the intentional binding (IB) paradigm. IB 
refers to the subjective binding in time of voluntary actions to their sensory consequences 
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). It has been proposed that IB provides a viable implicit 
measure of SoA (Moore & Haggard, 2010). Using this measure, Moore and Haggard (2008) 
demonstrated the contribution of both internal sensorimotor prediction and external action 
outcomes to SoA. Binding of the action to the outcome occurs when the likelihood of the 
outcome is strong, even in the absence of that outcome, i.e. sensorimotor prediction is 
sufficiently strong to produce binding. Furthermore, when sensorimotor prediction is weak, 
binding can occur but only when the outcome is present. On these trials the actual sensory 
outcome appears to trigger the binding effect retrospectively.  
 
The dual contribution of internal motoric signals and external, situational cues was also 
demonstrated by Moore, Wegner and Haggard (2009), again using the IB measure of SoA. 
As described above, priming the sensory consequences of movement can induce a false SoA 
(e.g. Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). By priming the sensory consequences of movement in the 
presence and absence of voluntary control over action, they investigated whether the presence 
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of internal motoric signals modified the influence of external primes on SoA. It was found 
that both cues (primes and motoric signals) influence SoA. However, the influence of primes 
is significantly stronger when the action is not under the participants’ own voluntary control.   
This is intriguing, it suggests that such cues are not additive but rather interactive and that 
their relative influence is determined by their reliability: In both studies the external cues 
exert more influence over SoA when internal motoric signals are weak. To explain these 
findings Moore, Wegner and Haggard (2009) proposed a form of optimal cue integration 
based on established models in human perception. In the following section we introduce these 
cue integration models of human perception, before considering their relevance to SoA.  
 
2. Cue integration models in human perception 
 
Accurate perception of features of the environment entails the use of multiple sources of 
information. Broadly speaking, there are two strategies for combining information: ‘sensory 
cue combination’, which maximises information from different sensory sources and ‘sensory 
cue integration’ which reduces the variance of the final perceptual estimate (Ernst & 
Bülthoff, 2004).  
 
2.1. Sensory cue combination and integration 
Because sensory information is inherently noisy, perception of an environmental feature 
based on a single sensory source would be unreliable. Our perceptual systems overcome this 
problem by generating percepts based on information derived from multiple sensory sources.  
When such information is complementary (i.e. not redundant), sensory combination is 
employed. This maximises the information provided by different sensory sources.  
 
One benefit of this strategy is that it can disambiguate sensory information. For example, 
when sitting in a train carriage someone’s mobile phone may ring with the same tone as 
yours. The auditory information is insufficient for you to tell whether or not it is your phone 
ringing. Only by visually inspecting your phone (or using some other sensory information 
such as vibration), can you resolve this uncertainty. By combining different sensory sources 
you have increased the amount of relevant information available, leading to a more robust 
estimate.  
 
 6 
 
Whilst sensory combination increases the amount of information from different sensory 
sources, sensory integration is a strategy which reduces the variance of the sensory estimate, 
thus boosting its reliability.  Sensory integration occurs when sensory information from 
different sources is redundant; that is, the information refers to the same feature of the 
environment, and is in the same units and coordinates.  
 
A fundamental goal for the perceptual system is to produce the most reliable estimate based 
on different sources of sensory information. By doing this an agent can effectively interact 
with its environment. ‘Maximum-Likelihood Estimation’ (MLE) is an optimal way of 
integrating different sources of sensory information, maximally reducing the variance of the 
final perceptual estimate. According to the MLE rule the final sensory estimate (ŝ) is the sum 
of individual sensory estimates (Equation 1) weighted by their reliability (the inverse 
variance of the sensory estimates; Equation 2). In this scheme, the variance of the final 
estimate is lower i.e. it is more reliable than estimates based on individual sensory sources.  
   
 
 (Equation 1) 
 
 
 (Equation 2) 
  
 
Ernst and Banks (2002) have shown that, when combining visual and haptic information, 
humans estimate object size in a way that is entirely consistent with the use of MLE: when 
both types of cues are available, estimates are strongly influenced by (the more reliable) 
visual information, and when the experimenters degraded the quality of visual information 
(by adding noise), the influence of haptic information increased.  
 
2.2.  Incorporating Prior Information: Bayesian integration of cues 
This MLE rule for sensory cue integration is entirely ‘bottom-up’; cue integration is modelled 
using likelihood functions only, thus ignoring the possible influence of prior information. 
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However, such ‘top-down' influences can be incorporated by adopting Bayes’ rule. Here, the 
cue weights are inversely proportional to the likelihood functions, and the integration of cues 
is influenced by prior information. Equation 3 is the Bayesian scheme for estimating an 
object’s location (X) based on visual (V) and auditory cues (A; following Knill & Pouget, 
2004).  
 
P(X|V,A) = p(V,A|X) p(X)/ p(V,A)
Posterior Likelihood Prior
(Equation 3) 
 
Here, the posterior distribution is proportional to the product of the likelihood and the prior 
(the denominator is a normalising constant). The likelihood can be decomposed into the 
product of the likelihood functions associated with each of the cues (V,A) (Equation 4). 
 
p(V,A|X) = p(V|X) p(A|X)
(Equation 4) 
 
What this means, in essence, is that the likelihood functions of each type of cue (visual and 
auditory) under a given set of circumstances, contribute to the overall “hypothesis” 
(posterior) about the location of the source of sensory stimulation. The posterior is a result of 
integration of the two cues dependent on their reliability. We have already shown how cue 
integration improves the estimate’s reliability. One advantage of the Bayesian scheme is that 
such reliability is further augmented:  incorporating prior information, if it is available, 
further reduces estimation variance. A number of studies suggest that the human perceptual 
system can implement this form of Bayesian cue integration and it is this form of cue 
integration that, we suggest, underpins SoA. (Of course it should be noted that Eq. 4 entails 
an assumption about the absolute or conditional independence of V and A, and this will not 
necessarily hold for all situations or indeed for particular patient groups). 
 
3.  Cue integration and SoA 
 
We suggest that the challenges facing the agency processing system are comparable to those 
facing the perceptual system. Accurate attribution of agency requires that uncertainty 
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concerning the agentic origins of movement is dealt with appropriately. This uncertainty is 
inherent in the internal motoric signals underpinning sense of agency: sensorimotor 
prediction is probabilistic. Uncertainty is also a feature of the external cues to agency owing 
to the presence of noise in the sensory processing and transmission of these cues. Bayesian 
cue integration represents an optimal strategy for dealing with this uncertainty.    
 
In this Bayesian cue integration framework, SoA can be viewed as the posterior (the belief or 
experience that one is the agent). The SoA will be determined by the integration of various 
agency cues, and the relative influence of these cues will be determined by their reliability. 
For example, consider a simplified case in which an agent has access only to sensorimotor 
(SM) and proprioceptive (PR) cues about the agentic origins of an action. In this example 
(Equation 5), the SoA (A) will be based on an integration of these two individual cue 
estimates of agency: 
 
p(A|SM,PR) = p(SM,PR|A) p(A)/ p(SM,PR)
Posterior Likelihood Prior
(Equation 5) 
 
As in the example above, the likelihood would be the product of the likelihood functions 
associated with each of the cues (SM,PR) (Equation 6): 
 
p(SM,PR|A) = p(SM|A) p(PR|A)
 (Equation 6) 
 
This can be extended to incorporate other, external cues such as those provided in the study 
above (Moore, Wegner and Haggard, 2009). It provides a framework within which to 
understand how SoA depends on both internal and external cues with greater or lesser 
reliability. If one cue is absent, other cues can still be exploited allowing flexibility and 
robustness. By recognising the contribution of various agency cues we can also account for a 
wider range of findings than those models of SoA which emphasise the contribution of just 
one cue (see section 4.1 below). Moreover, it acknowledges the interaction between cues: 
both of the IB studies described above found that the influence of external cues to agency 
increased when the reliability of internal motoric information decreased (Moore & Haggard, 
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2008; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). The relative resistance to external agency cues 
when internal motoric information is reliable suggests a higher intrinsic weighting for this 
latter source of information. Furthermore the increased influence of external agency cues 
when internal motoric information becomes less reliable suggests a shift in weighting in line 
with changes in reliability. This framework has also been invoked to explain the different 
pattern of results in patients with schizophrenia on SoA paradigms (Synofzik, Thier, Leube, 
Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2009; Voss et al., 2010), which we discuss in more detail below. It 
should be noted too that the prior information itself will have a certain degree of reliability 
and that strong, reliable priors may have a dominant influence on the ensuing SoA. We will 
consider this possibility – that expectations influence SoA profoundly. 
 
As we have described, cue integration also results in the variance of the final estimate being 
less than the variance for each of the other cues individually. This improved reliability is 
important for SoA. In order to interact with, and exploit, its environment optimally, an agent 
has to determine those sensory events for which it is responsible. Such reliability is further 
augmented under the Bayesian approach to cue integration (compared with others such as the 
related Maximum Likelihood Estimate scheme): incorporating prior information, if it is 
known, reduces estimation variance. Recognising this offers a perspective on agency 
disruptions. We propose that SoA emerges from the integration of prior information and of 
internal and external cues. Furthermore, this integration is influenced by the reliability of 
each of these. According to this view, agency disruptions may be better understood by 
considering specific alterations in the nature and reliability of these signals of agency. 
 
In short, the Bayesian approach acknowledges the importance of multiple cues in the 
emergence of SoA. The reliability of cues, as well as prior expectations, will determine the 
extent to which they contribute to this experience. Below, we consider the application of this 
view to relevant data in healthy adults before considering its utility in understanding 
disrupted SoA associated with certain disorders. 
  
3.1.  Further evidence in support of cue integration in SoA 
In the domain of human perception, vision often has a higher intrinsic weighting than other 
perceptual modalities for certain estimates, such as size or location (Ernst & Banks, 2002; 
Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004). The data from Moore, Wegner & Haggard (2009) suggest that, for 
SoA, internal cues to agency have a higher intrinsic weighting than external cues. Therefore, 
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a strong prediction from the cue integration framework is that internal cues to agency will 
dominate SoA. As a consequence, the presence of such internal cues could result in illusory 
experiences of movement. Alternatively, the absence of internal cues to agency could result 
in a feeling of not having moved, when in fact one had. A recent study by Desmurget et al 
(2009) supports these predictions. They directly stimulated parietal and premotor regions in 
seven patients undergoing brain surgery. Stimulation of inferior parietal regions (left and 
right) produced experiences of intending to move. Crucially, when stimulation was increased 
patients reported having actually moved despite no detectable evidence for this. This suggests 
that the internal cue to agency, the intention to move, was sufficient to produce the 
experience of movement, as is predicted by the cue integration model. Desmurget and 
colleagues also found that, when dorsal premotor regions were stimulated, patients did not 
experience an intention to move. Importantly, when stimulation intensity was increased this 
elicited detectable movements, but the patient reported no experience of moving. This 
suggests that the absence of the internal cue to agency, the intention to move, eliminated the 
experience of agency. Again, this is predicted by the cue integration framework. It should be 
noted that these patients could not see their own bodies. Visual cues, we would predict, 
should reduce SoA during parietal stimulation and increase it during premotor stimulation.  
 
Importantly, these findings by Desmurget et al are not readily explained by other models of 
SoA. For example, the CM (described in section 1.) states that SoA is dependent on the 
comparison between internal sensorimotor predictions and the sensory consequences of 
movement. However, in this study, patients experienced SoA in the absence of movement: no 
comparison was possible. An alternative model developed by Wegner and colleagues 
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002; Wegner, 2003) also fails to explain this finding. 
According to this view SoA is based on a causal inference about the relationship between 
thought and action (and also action outcomes): for example, if a thought occurs prior to 
action, is consistent with the action and if there is no other possible cause of the action, then it 
is inferred that I caused by action. The patients who experienced SoA in the absence of 
movement are not consistent with the predictions of this model.  
 
Subsequently presented external cues can also over-ride internal cues to agency such that the 
memory for agency may be profoundly changed. In the choice blindness (CB) paradigm, 
participants accept and then justify a choice they have not in fact made (Johansson, Hall, 
Sikström, & Olsson, 2005; Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, & Deutgen, 2010). One may 
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invoke a cue integration explanation for this, whereby the external cue to agency (i.e. the 
actual presented external feedback about the choice) is sufficiently compelling to override 
any intrinsic signals about the choice that had been made. In other words the external cue 
receives higher weighting, and therefore contributes more to the experience, than internal 
cues. By this token, we would predict that, if the strength of the internal cue were augmented 
then participants would become more resistant to the experimenter’s subterfuge. 
 
More recent IB data is also consistent with the cue integration framework. Desantis, Roussel, 
Waszak  (2011) investigated IB under different agency contexts: a) participants were unsure 
whether they or a confederate had produced an outcome; b) participants were told that they 
had produced the outcome; and c) participants were told that the confederate had produced 
the outcome. They found normal binding in the uncertain condition, where there was no 
explicit instruction concerning the agentic origins of the outcome. They also found that IB 
was increased when participants were led to believe an outcome was contingent on their own 
behaviour, compared to the condition in which they were led to believe that the outcome was 
caused by the confederate. These results suggest that under uncertainty, participants use 
sensorimotor information to guide their experience of action, consistent with the idea that 
internal cues to agency receive higher weighting. However, if external cues to agency are 
sufficiently compelling (i.e. in the form of an instruction that the confederate is now in 
control), this may over-ride the sensorimotor information.  
 
There is, then, convincing evidence that SoA can be characterised in terms of a weighted 
integration of internal and external cues. Moreover, this approach may explain a wider range 
of agency data than existing models. However, while we believe that the evidence presented 
in support of the cue integration approach is convincing, it remains, nevertheless, indirect. 
Perhaps more direct evidence could be obtained by adopting the approach used by Ernst and 
Banks (2002), independently manipulating the reliabilities of two agency cues. 
 
In Moore, Wegner and Haggard’s (2009) paper it was suggested that cue integration may 
help explain disruptions in SoA associated with certain neurological disorders, an idea taken 
further in a commentary on that paper by Synofzik, Vosgerau and Lindner (2009). In the 
following section, we expand on this idea. While evidence is limited, we would like to show 
that these disorders may be characterised in terms of changes in the how priors and cues are 
integrated. and that taking this perspective contributes to the goal of understanding how 
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neurochemical and functional anatomical disturbances may manifest in an altered experience 
of agency.  
 
4. Cue integration and disorders of SoA 
Disturbed SoA may be present, sometimes strikingly so, both as a consequence of focal 
neurological lesions and of the, presumably more diffuse, neural changes underlying mental 
illness. We first consider certain well-known neurological conditions (Anarchic Hand 
Syndrome, Alien Hand Syndrome and Utilisation Behaviour) which are characterised by 
relatively well-demarcated disruptions before considering the more global deficits 
characteristic of schizophrenia. 
 
4.1. Cue integration and neurological disorders  
 
4.1.1.  Anarchic hand Syndrome(AnHS) 
AnHS (Marchetti & Della Sala, 1998) is characterised by the loss of sense of control for an 
affected limb. In contrast to Alien Hand Syndrome (see below) the sufferer recognises the 
hand as belonging to him or herself but there is a compelling experience that it is beyond 
control, having its own will and responding to external cues. In one reported instance 
(Feinberg, Schindler, Flanagan, & Haber, 1992), a patient remarked that his hand seemed to 
anticipate his own intentions, making a movement that he subsequently felt the desire to 
enact. It should be remarked that the movements of the hand are not utterly random: they 
appear goal-directed and sensitive to external stimuli. They may, moreover, be amenable to 
external verbal commands (Cantagallo, Spinazzola, Rabuffetti, & Della Sala, 2010). What is 
lacking is the sufferer’s sense of having willed the action or of being able to control or stop it. 
Nor is there some general deficit of agency: other movements are experienced as intended 
and voluntary (indeed, sometimes the non-affected hand is employed to physically control the 
anarchic movements of the affected hand). 
 
5.1.2 Utilisation Behviour (UB) 
In UB (Lhermitte, 1983), the patient’s actions are similarly driven by external stimuli. For 
example, he might don a pair of spectacles that happen to be lying in front of him. A second 
pair may then be picked up and worn on top of the first. In contrast to AnHS, UB is not 
experienced as counter-intentional or uncontrollable by the patient. Rather, it appears to be 
accepted without question. Indeed, the patient, when challenged, provides superficial 
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explanations for it. As with AnHS, behaviour may be modified by verbal cues. For example, 
Lhermitte (1986) describes a patient who, on being told that he was in an art gallery, began to 
browse and comment on the pictures on the walls, a phenomenon that Lhermitte referred to as 
“Environmental Dependency Syndrome” (Lhermitte, 1986). It appears to be related, too, to 
imitative behaviour (echopraxia), perhaps another example of the behaviour being driven 
predominantly by external cues. 
 
 5.1.3 Alien Hand Syndrome 
While the term Alien Hand Syndrome (AlHS) is sometimes used interchangeably with 
AnHS, these two clinical syndromes are quite distinct. AlHS occurs in the context of a 
hemiparesis which the patient denies (anosognosia for hemiparesis). In addition to denying 
that the limb is paralysed, the patient behaves as though it is not, sometimes claiming that it 
moves normally and, in the case of AlHS, asserting that it does not belong to them 
(asomatognosia) and perhaps even belongs to someone else (somatoparaphrenia). Baier & 
Karnath (2008) reported an intimate link between a tendency to deny the existence of a 
hemiparesis and a disturbed sense of ownership for the affect limb, further identifying 
illusory body movements in a subset (5 out of 11) of individuals. Feinberg et al (2000) 
showed a similar proportion of illusory movements and, further, reported that such illusions 
could be provoked by instructions to move the affected limb.  
 
5.1.4 AnHS, UB and AlHS: dissociable disturbances in cue integration? 
There may be much to be gained by considering these syndromes together (e.g. Spence 2002; 
Pacherie, 2007). While AnHS and UB are strikingly similar in a number of ways, most 
notably in the tendency towards behaviour which is driven by external cues rather than 
internal goals, they differ greatly in the accompanying subjective experience of the 
environmentally-driven behaviours.  
 
Blakemore, Wolpert and Frith (2002) have suggested that these two groups of patients differ 
in terms of their ability to represent (or access representations of) intended movements: AHS 
patients maintain this capacity whereas UB patients do not. (Presumably, these differences 
emerge because the underlying neurological deficits are distinct: AnHS is associated with 
lesions to supplementary motor area while UB is primarily associated with frontal damage 
(Lhermitte, 1983) though more widespread damage to fronto-striatal circuits may be critical 
(Archibald et al, 2001)). With this in mind, we may speculate that both types of patient, on 
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the surface at least, receive some external evidence that their behaviour is agentic. For 
example, they see and feel their hand moving and interacting with environmental cues. 
However, in the case of AnHS, there is a preserved capacity to recognise that external cues to 
agency are in direct conflict with their own goals, to which they have access. As such, 
patients will treat these external cues as unreliable indicators of agency. The consequence of 
this - preserved internal cues (indicating lack of agency) and unreliable external cues to 
agency - is the typical AnHS experience of a loss of SoA. In the case of UB, patients fail to 
recognise the fact that external cues to agency are in direct conflict with their own goals as 
they are unable to access these goal representations. In the absence of any perceived conflict, 
these external cues will be treated as reliable indicators of agency and patients will accept 
these movements as their own, justifying them with post hoc explanations. A comparable 
phenomenon in healthy people is  may be the choice blindness paradigm described above and 
the observations that external cues carry relatively more weight when internal cues are 
unreliable (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). 
 
While the AlHS, like AnHS, is characterised by a lack of SoA, the former also entails a 
denial of ownership. Synofzik and colleagues argue that considering AnHS and AlHS 
underline the importance of distinguishing ownership from agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & 
Newen, 2008). This is a compelling argument: after all, how can we have SoA for a limb that 
we do not own? However, it is worth noting that, even when the sense of ownership is absent, 
the desire to move the affected limb can lead to the illusion or hallucination that it has indeed 
moved (Feinberg, Roane, & Ali, 2000; Baier & Karnath, 2008). Moreover, this phenomenon 
shows a close relationship with both the degree of anosognosia (failure to recognise the 
hemiparesis) and disturbed sense of ownership. In our view, this relationship underlines the 
importance of the optimal integration of multiple cues in generating both the sense of 
ownership and of agency. Put simply, the sense of ownership emerges from somatosensory 
cues that are attenuated in such patients, with a corresponding attenuation of ownership 
experience. However, in the context of a conscious attempt to move the affected limb, the 
preserved intention may be sufficient to engender a (false) sense that movement has actually 
occurred. The internal motor cue that the movement is going to be made carries a 
comparatively greater weight than the noisy or absent sensory feedback and it is this that 
leads to the illusion that movement has occurred. This view leads to the prediction that the 
tendency to illusory movements under instruction would be greater in patients in whom 
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anosognosia and asomatognosia is more pronounced, which is precisely what Feinberg and 
colleagues observed. 
 
What is not clear is why AlHS is accompanied by the bizarre beliefs of the patient: the 
disavowal that the limb is paralysed or the assertion that it belongs to someone else. As 
Synofzik et al observe, we may consider sense of ownership as emerging from multiple 
sensory cues and the absence of these cues in the paralysed limb might account for the feeling 
that it is an alien hand. But for the patient to arrive at the circumscribed delusional belief that 
it belongs to another is harder to fathom. In the next section, we consider cue integration in 
the context of the delusional state. 
 
4.2.  Cue integration and schizophrenia  
 
A fundamental disturbance in SoA may plausibly be invoked to explain many of the positive 
symptoms (delusions and hallucinations) of schizophrenia. Passivity phenomena, quite 
clearly involve the misattribution of one’s own thoughts, feelings and actions to an external 
agent. In thought insertion for example, the deluded individual believes that his thoughts are 
not, in reality his own: they are actually those of another. In delusions of motor control, an 
action is perceived to have been initiated and controlled by another. In such cases, the 
misapplication of a SoA is obvious. But other features may also be characterised, albeit less 
obviously, by misattribution of agency. Auditory hallucinations clearly arise in the brain of 
the sufferer, perhaps as internal speech, but they are perceived as originating externally. 
There are a number of studies of reality distortion in schizophrenia that clearly show a bias 
towards attributing internally-generated percepts to an external source (Keefe, Arnold, 
Bayen, McEvoy, & Wilson, 2002; Simons, Davis, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006). Of 
course, some of the other apparently irrational beliefs (delusions) of schizophrenia are less 
easy to explain in terms of agency misattribution. A delusion that one is being persecuted for 
example or the belief that general external events are referring specifically to oneself 
(delusions of reference) may be less amenable to this explanation. Yet these too have been 
considered in such terms (Frith, 1992), and it has been suggested that a fundamental deficit 
that leads to repeated confusion between internal and external origins of sense-data may be a 
prelude to the formation of such beliefs (e.g. Fletcher & Frith, 2009). 
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Thus, there are prima facie reasons for considering an altered SoA as being critical in 
explaining symptoms of schizophrenia. We propose that the Bayesian framework describing 
the emergence of SoA from integration of multiple cues may provide a powerful way of 
understanding this disruption more clearly and rooting it in the neurobiology of the disorder. 
We consider three possible disruptions: (1) an altered reliability of internal cues leading to a 
diminished recognition of internally generated movements; (2) a spurious enhancement of the 
salience and/or reliability of external cues leading to a greater tendency to attribute causal 
power to external rather than internal events; (3) a set of altered prior expectations leading to 
a greater tendency to make external attributions. 
 
4.2.1.  Delusions and the reliability of internal cues. 
As we have suggested, internal cues may contribute in a variety of ways to SoA. For 
example, motor activity, sensory consequences and the extent to which the former predicts 
the latter, may be invoked to account for the sense that a particular action was internally 
generated. However, in schizophrenia, increased noise, perhaps arising from upregulated or 
chaotic dopamine firing, may obfuscate these normally reliable signals. It has been suggested 
that dopaminergic neuron firing codes the reliability of signals (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 
2003). Thus, a dysregulation in this coding might lead to a change in the signal-to-noise ratio 
and a corresponding attenuation of the degree to which these signals are able to contribute to 
the SoA. It would also lead to an increased likelihood of mismatch between the predicted and 
the actual sensory consequence of a movement, a mismatch which has been compellingly 
related to psychotic symptoms (Blakemore et al., 2002; Shergill, et al, 2005; Frith, 2005). 
Such a mismatch, referred to as prediction error, is a crucial learning signal (Schultz & 
Dickinson, 2000). As well as providing a useful framework for considering shifts in agency 
experience (as above), the idea of prediction error as a critical updating signal has been 
invoked to explain abnormal updating of beliefs about the environment in schizophrenia (see 
for example Corlett, Honey & Fletcher, 2007; Fletcher & Frith 2009; Corlett, Frith, & 
Fletcher, 2009; Corlett, Honey, Krystal, & Fletcher, 2010).  
 
Recent evidence strongly supports the idea that, in patients with schizophrenia, these internal 
signals are corrupted by noise. Voss and colleagues (2010) used the same probabilistic IB 
paradigm developed by Moore and Haggard (2008; see Section 1). People with 
Schizophrenia showed a strong predictive contribution to IB in both the 50% and the 75% 
conditions. In healthy controls the predictive contribution was much stronger in the 75% 
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condition (replicating Moore & Haggard’s, 2008, finding). These data show that prediction in 
schizophrenia was noisy: The predictive contribution to IB was insensitive to actual outcome 
probability. Intriguingly, people with schizophrenia also showed an increase in the 
contribution of external agency cues to IB. This is predicted by the cue integration 
framework: The SoA is dominated by the most reliable source of information.  
 
This finding is compatible with a study by Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, and 
Lindner (2010) using an agency attribution paradigm. They showed that agency judgments in 
people with schizophrenia relied more strongly on visual feedback about an action rather than 
on internal sensorimotor cues. Moreover, the degree of reliance on external visual feedback 
appeared to be associated with the reliability of internal sensorimotor information about the 
action: The variability of internal sensorimotor information in patients was approximately 
twice that of controls, and the influence of external visual feedback about the action in 
patients was about twice that of controls. This is compatible with predictions made within a 
cue integration framework.   
 
One might further predict that a reduction in the reliability of internal signals could lead to a 
weakening of the sense of bodily ownership, a suggestion in keeping with the increased 
propensity of people with schizophrenia to experience illusory body ownership (Peled, 
Ritsner, Hirschmann, Geva, & Modai, 2000). In short, noisy (and therefore unpredictable) 
internal signals produce an enhanced tendency to attribute changes to external agents rather 
than to oneself. 
 
4.2.2.  Delusions and the spurious enhancement of external cues 
Previous models of schizophrenia have suggested that environmental stimuli and events 
acquire an importance or salience that leads to their incorporation into the sufferer’s beliefs 
about of the world. This model of excessive salience has been linked to dopaminergic 
dysregulation and has been invoked to account for both the symptoms and the characteristic 
response to treatment (Kapur, 2003). Moreover, frequent reference has been made to the 
observation that patients with schizophrenia often see meaningful links between fortuitously 
co-occurring events (so-called “apophenia”). Schneider (1930) commented on a pronounced 
tendency to see connections both between coincident external events and between 
simultaneously occurring external event and internal “impressions” or percepts.  
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This alteration in the perceived salience of external events, and the corresponding 
reallocation of attention towards them (and away from internal signals), may alter the 
weightings applied in the process of cue integration. This could lead to a fundamental 
alteration in the SoA. Spurious but compelling associations between external occurrences, or 
between external events and internal experiences, could lead to a failure to attribute correctly 
an event to oneself. For example, if, as one moved, there was a coincident noise (a car horn 
perhaps), then the enhanced, inappropriate association between one’s movement and the 
noise might lead to the experience that one had caused the noise by one’s movement, or, 
alternatively, that the sensation of movement was in some way caused by the noise. The latter 
could ultimately lead to the delusion of control, particularly when compounded by the noisy 
sensorimotor signals discussed above. 
 
4.2.3.  Delusions and prior expectations 
There are many examples in healthy people of the illusion of being in control when one is not 
(e.g. Langer, 1975) or, conversely, of the sense that one’s own movements are actually under 
some external control. Such illusions of control can arise as a consequence of sufficiently 
strong prior beliefs. A good example of this is the “table-turning” phenomenon wherein 
groups of necromancers experience a table moving, apparently under the control of the spirit 
world. Using force sensors, Michael Faraday (1853) showed that actually, the movements of 
the table depended upon forces from the living rather than the dead. Ouija boards, hypnotism 
and facilitated communication are further examples of how prior beliefs fundamentally alter 
the experience of SoA or, in Wegner’s elegant description: '...the simple belief that the 
action can come from the other person is the main basis of action projection. It is the 
attribution to outside agency, in other words, that helps to fuel the loss of conscious will. 
Once the belief in outside agency is in place, the processes for interpreting one's own action 
are rocked at the base' (Wegner, 2002; p.199) 
 
This is  a phenomenon that has been replicated experimentally (Wegner, Fuller, & Sparrow, 
2003). Prior expectations clearly, therefore, influence on SoA. This is important to bear in 
mind when considering delusions. Recent models of psychotic experience and belief have 
considered the importance of altered or aberrant priors (See Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Corlett et 
al., 2009; Corlett et al., 2010). Such ideas are necessarily speculative but the clear tendency 
of people with delusions to use prior information in distinct, sub-optimal ways (e.g. 
Woodward, Moritz, & Chen, 2006; Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007) must be 
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considered relevant to their experiences of action and agency particularly when so many of 
their symptoms involve erroneous external attribution. In short, once the belief has formed 
that one is under external control, particularly in the setting of noisy internal cueing, this 
belief generally shapes the interpretation of one’s experiences. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
We have reviewed and elaborated on the cue integration approach introduced by Moore, 
Wegner & Haggard (2009), placing this approach within the context of well-established cue 
integration models of human perception and outlining its possible contribution to the 
understanding of SoA in both health and disease. We acknowledge that much of this is 
speculative though argue that there are a number of instances, in the context of both normal 
and disrupted SoA, where this perspective – that weighted integration of multiple, internal 
and external, cues together with prior beliefs contributes to and shapes the emergent SoA – 
provides a useful framework for understanding experimental and clinical phenomena. Clearly 
further research explicitly testing the predictions made by the cue integration framework is 
required. One approach, as we suggest above, would be to adopt paradigms used in previous 
research on human perception (e.g. Ernst & Banks, 2002) in which the reliability of several 
cues is systematically manipulated and dissociated  
 
Other outstanding issues concern the specific details of the framework. For example, the 
contribution of internal motoric cues to SoA is likely to be asynchronous with external 
agency cues based on sensory feedback about the action, which are necessarily processed 
later. Such asynchrony can be problematic for cue integration (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004). One 
possible solution would be to consider a dynamical cue integration mechanism that updates 
its estimates as new information becomes available (these are known as ‘Kalman filter’ 
approaches). 
 
A recurring theoretical problem in the discussion of Bayesian frameworks such as this 
concerns the origins of ‘priors’. One possibility is that there may be a natural tendency to be 
biased towards ascribing agency to oneself under conditions of uncertainty (e.g. Farrer et al., 
2008; Desantis et al., 2011), i.e. the prior for “self” is inherently stronger than for “other”. We 
can only speculate on whether or not this might confer some advantage. However, it appears 
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that, even in infants, there is a remarkable ability to flexibly shift between self- and other-
attributions (see Gweon & Schulz, 2011). This suggests that, if there is an inherently greater 
prior for self under uncertainty, it is easily overcome by experience. One thing that is worth 
noting is that if, as we suggest happens in schizophrenia, one repeatedly but unsuccessfully 
tries to minimise error and uncertainty, then this could enhance the prior for external rather 
than  internal control. This in turn may lead to the strong belief that one is being controlled 
and persecuted by some external agent, with this belief itself acting as a strong prior in 
further interactions with the world. Key to this proposal is ‘abductive inference’, or inference 
to the best explanation. Abductive inference was raised and thoroughly examined by Charles 
Pierce at the turn of the 19
th
 century (see (Peirce, Putnman, Ketner, 1992)). It involves 
determining the most likely cause of an unexpected event. As we have described above, 
persistent error signalling is implicated in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. Over time the 
patient will repeatedly experience the sensory consequences of their actions as being 
unexpected. The patient may conclude, therefore, that they are not in control of their actions 
(see Coltheart, Menzies & Sutton, 2010, for a review of the putative role of abductive 
inference in delusion formation). As we suggest above, once the belief has formed that one is 
under external control, particularly in the setting of noisy internal cueing, the interpretation of 
one’s experiences is shaped by this belief. 
 
Despite the current limitations, which arise from a lack of evidence more than from a failure 
of the explanatory power of the framework, we suggest that the cue integration approach 
holds real promise in shedding light on the cognitive processes supporting SoA. In particular, 
its application to schizophrenia may prove important in relating the subjective experiences 
that characterise the disorder to the underlying neural and neurochemical disturbances. 
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